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Judicial Protection of Membership in Private
Associations
INTRODUCTION
Membership in a private association' can be extremely advantageous.
A member is afforded many social and economic advantages not readily
available to outsiders. Because an association offers these advantages,
it must be able to control its members by disciplining the deviant ones.
For the most part, private associations are left to govern their internal
affairs without outside interference. Though such a policy be desirable,
an association must be held to some minimum standard in expelling a
member.
The first part of this article will examine the standards to which
private associations must conform in expelling members. Further, the
situations in which the courts will order reinstatement of an expelled
member will be analyzed. Such relief is not an exclusive remedy but
it is probably the most effective for the wrongfully expelled member.
A judgment for money damages can be awarded but this offers only
temporary balm, for the social and economic advantages available to a
member, and lost through expulsion, are not easily compensated for in
money.2 Though damages can be awarded, they are, at most, only
nominal and compensate for such things as injury to reputation and loss
of the amenities of the club.' The inadequacy of this relief is evident
from the fact that wounded feelings, humiliation, and anxiety resulting
from an unwarranted expulsion are not easily susceptible to any pecuniary
standard of measure.' This practical difficulty generally deprives the
plaintiff of any real monetary redress.'
The second half of this article will deal with a comparatively recent
judicial phenomenon. An examination will be made of the instances
when a court will compel a reasonably qualified applicant to be admitted
to membership in a private association.
1. Included under the term "private associations" are labor unions, professional associations,
churches, social, and fraternal organizations.
2. Conversely, reinstatement by judicial decree may be like the sword of Damocles over one's
head. The group will try almost any means, legal and non-legal, to eliminate the undesirable
member.
3. See Wright v. Bath Club Co., 70 SOL. J. 828 (1926). But see Local 4, Nat'l Organiza-
tion Masters v. Brown, 258 Ala. 18, 61 So. 2d 93 (1952).
4. In Bowen v. Morris, 219 Ala. 689, 691, 123 So. 222, 223 (1929), the court said that the
matter of "awaiting the uncertainties as to quantum of damages, the delay in recovery... are
matters going to the adequacy of legal remedies."
5. Lavalle v. Socet6i St. Jean Baptiste, 17 R.I. 680, 687, 24 Ad. 467, 469 (1892).
Private Associations
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN REVIEWING EXPULSIONS
Whenever a court seeks to resolve a membership dispute, there are
several interests that must be balanced. First, courts are reluctant to
interfere with the internal affairs of private associations.6 This is so
because of the public interest in promoting well managed, autonomous
societies. However, the court's function is to see that these associations,
while performing their societal functions, also provide an internal system
of substantial justice for the member who must be disciplined.7 Secondly,
courts abhor involving themselves in a morass of ritual oftentimes found
in these cases.' Despite this, the courts will interpret such provisions to
ascertain if the expulsion was properly ordered by those who had the
power to do so.' The third and most salient interest to be considered is
the safeguarding of the member's rights when membership is an eco-
nomic necessity.'"
Another consideration implicit in many of the expulsion cases re-
volves about the type of association involved. Though this factor is not
always verbalized, it may be the pivotal one in determining the pro-
priety of intervention. Cases involving expulsion from church mem-
bership present the most notable example. While some courts have
desisted on the ground that they do not want to become arbiters of mooted
points of religious doctrine," the real underlying consideration appears to
be the constitutional dignity of the separation of church and state." De-
spite the near prerogatives of sovereignty accorded religious congrega-
tions, the recent trend of cases has been toward broadening judicial re-
view of such expulsions.'"
An ever-present problem is the difficulty of determining whether an
association's action in expelling a member has been so unreasonable
that he should be reinstated. This is particularly acute when free speech
6. See Local 57, Bhd. of Painters v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 234, 16 So. 2d 705, 711 (1944)
("courts are indisposed to interfere with the internal management of an unincorporated, vol-
untary association...."); Hussey v. Gallagher, 61 Ga. 86, 94 (1878) ("It is... wiser...
that the courts should [stay] aloof in the internal struggles .... ").
7. Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L REV. 993, 1020-
27 (1930).
8. Ibid. See Hopson v. Swansy, 1 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
9. See Bouldin.v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 140 (1872).
10. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961). Pro-
fessor Chafee suggests a fourth interest - avoidance of judicial determination of non-legal
issues. Chafee, supra note 7, at 1020-27.
11. Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872); Chase v. Cheney, 58 IM. 509,
537 (1871).
12. "The judicial eye of the civil authority of this land of religious liberty cannot penetrate
the veil of the Church, nor can the arm of this Court either rend or touch that veil for the
forbidden purpose of vindicating the alleged wrongs of the excinded members." Shannon v.
Frost, 42 Ky. (3 B. Mun.) 253, 259 (1842).
13. See, e.g., Slaughter v. New St. John Missionary Baptist Church, 8 Ia. App. 430 (1928);
Randolph v. First Baptist Church, 120 N.E.2d 485 (Ohio C.P. 1954).
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is involved, especially in the area of union participation in political activi-
ties. In DeMille v. American Fed. of Radio Artists4 the plaintiff was
expelled for refusing to contribute to the union's political fund, the
purpose with which he did not agree. The case resolved itself into the
dichotomy of allowing a member complete political freedom and col-
lective bargaining or of allowing only members whose political views
are compatible with the majority to remain in the union. The court
held that the latter factor should prevail.' 5
Expulsions from professional associations likewise present issues not
always verbalized. For example, courts realize that medical societies
have greatly benefited the public by raising professional standards. Much
of this can be attributed to an almost unfettered control over the selection
of members and the expulsion of unqualified ones." Obviously, courts
are less qualified to judge such a member's qualifications than are the so-
cieties themselves.
These considerations, while not always discussed, are implicit in any
decision. Depending upon the weight given any one of these factors, it
may sway the decision as to whether to intervene.
EXHAUSTION OF INTERNAL REMEDIES
As a general rule, one who is seeking relief in court must first exhaust
any remedies within the association. 7 The constitution and by-laws of
the association usually provide the internal procedure by which a dispute
between an association and its members is resolved.'" Provisions re-
quiring an aggrieved member first to resort to the machinery provided
by the organization before appealing to the courts have been almost uni-
versally upheld even though valuable property rights are involved.' 9
Thus, the failure to exhaust all internal remedies would normally be an
14. 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948).
15. 'Mere disagreement with the majority does not absolve the dissenting minority from
compliance with action of the association taken through authorized union methods." Id. at
150, 187 P.2d at 776. But see Gallaher v. American Legion, 154 Misc. 281, 277 N.Y. Supp.
81 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 242 App. Div. 604, 271 N.Y. Supp. 1109 (1934).
16. This is the most common result in the medical profession. See Note, 63 YALE LJ. 937,
949, 959-61, 976 (1954). See also Pert, Hospital Privileges Revisited, 9 CI.V. MA1. L RxV.
137, 146-47 (1960).
17. Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 293 P.2d 862
(1956); Reid v. Medical Soc'y, 156 N.Y. Supp. 780 (Sup. Ct. 1915), afl'd nem., 177 App.
Div. 939, 163 N.Y. Supp. 1129 (1917).
18. For a view of the appeal system within the American Medical Association see Comment,
63 YALE L.J. 937, 949-50 (1954). See generally Vorenberg, Exhaustion of Intraunion Rem-
edies as a Condition Precedent to Appeal to the Courts, 2 LAB. L.J. 487 (1951).
19. E.g., Peters v. Minnesota Dep't of Ladies of Grand Army of Republic, 239 Minn. 133,
58 N.W.2d 58 (1953),reaff'd, 245 Minn. 563, 73 N.W.2d 621 (1955); Dewar v. Lodge No.
44, B.P.O.E., 155 Minn. 98, 192 N.W. 358 (1923).
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effective defense to any subsequent suit." Several courts have even re-
quired non-members first to seek redress within an organization when
suing for benefits,2 admission to membership,22 or reinstatement."
The reasoning behind such a rule with respect to members is that the
individual, by voluntarily joining an organization, has contractually bound
himself to abide by its constitution and by-laws so far as they may relate
to grievance procedure. Thus, if the by-laws require a member to bring
his grievance to the intra-associational tribunal before resorting to the
courts, this would be a sine qua non to any action that could be brought
on the contract of membership.24 Such a rule is entirely proper, for as the
association provides a source of personal contact and benefit to its mem-
bers, it must be able to wield some power of discipline, even to the point
of expulsion, without fear of outside interference.2" Since the associa-
tion is also a party to the contract, it likewise must observe any procedure
set out in its constitution and by-laws.
However desirable this rule may be, it is so riddled with exceptions
that it is often rendered impotent. The rigidity with which this rule is
adhered to varies proportionately with the economic importance of the
organization. This point is illustrated by two Alabama cases decided two
years apart. In Costa v. La Luna Servante2" the plaintiff was expelled
from a mystic society. On appeal the court rigidly applied the exhaus-
tion of internal remedies rule.2' But when the plaintiffs in Local 4, Nat'l
Organization Masters v. Brown ' were expelled from a labor union, the
court enunciated a broad exception and did require the exhaustion of
internal remedies.'
Examples of exceptions to this rule are multifold. The opportunity
to comply with the exhaustion of internal remedies requirement must be
reasonable. The expelled member will not be required to wait two
20. See, e.g., Levy v. Magnolia Lodge No. 29, I.O.O.F., 110 Cal. 297, 42 Pac. 887 (1895).
21. King v. Wynema Council, No. 10, Daughters of Pocahantas, 25 Del. (2 Boyce) 255, 78
Ad. 845 (1911). See Grubbs v. Comanche Tribe, 16 Ga. App. 11, 84 S.E. 494 (1915).
22. Davis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen, 272 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
23. Grand Lodge v. Taylor, 79 Fla. 441, 84 So. 609 (1920); Forth v. Local 201, United
Bhd. of Carpenters, 171 Kan. 177, 231 P.2d 252 (1951).
24. Hickman v. Kline, 71 Nev. 55, 279 P.2d 662 (1955); White v. Brownell, 2 Daly 329
(N.Y. C.P. 1868).
25. See generally Summers, Disciplnary Powers of Unions, 3 IND. & LAB. REL. R v. 483
(1950).
26. 255 Ala. 6, 49 So. 2d 672 (1950).
27. "li1t must appear that the member first exhausted all remedies within the association
before applying to the court." Id. at 7, 49 So. 2d at 673.
28. Id. at 23, 61 So. 2d 93 (1952).
29. "It is obvious that they would suffer considerable damage, be put to great expense, in-
convenience and loss of time in trying to secure their rights on appeal." 258 Ala. at 23, 61
So. 2d at 97.
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years for a national convention to comply with this requirement. Like-
wise, the geographical or financial inaccessability of perfecting an intra-
associational appeal will spell an exception where this means loss of one's
job in the interim.3
In most instances, the act of expulsion must have occurred first."2
But where a member is precluded from having a fair and effective trial,
he may go directly to the courts.3 The same result obtains where an
appeal of loss of membership within an association would be "a futile,
useless and idle act . .."" Moreover, where the provisions for internal
appeal are interpreted as precatory rather than mandatory, an exception
will lie. " A waiver of the exhaustion requirement is implied in a situa-
tion where an association has failed to follow its own procedure in
disciplining a member, thus estopping it from raising this defense in
court.3 6 In a situation where the "appeal board" sat in on the expulsion
proceedings and several members of that board voted for expulsion of
the member, it was held that the exhaustion requirement need not be fol-
lowed. 7
From this desultory review of the exhaustion of remedies require-
ment, one can see that the rule is more honored in its exceptions, and
hence, it offers no homogeneous answer to this aspect of the law of pri-
vate associations. The greater the economic implications of member-
ship, the more likely that the courts will find an exception to this rule.
30. In Naylor v. Harkins, 11 N.J. 435,445, 94 A.2d 825, 830 (1953), the court held: "The
notion that members ... must await [intra-union] review of the legality of their ouster at a
convention to be held almost two years thereafter .. .simply shocks our sense of justice and
we have no hesitancy in rejecting it." Accord, Gleeson v. Conrad, 81 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Sup.
Ct. 1948), modified, 276 App. Div. 861, 93 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1949). Contra, Snay v. Lovely,
276 Mass. 159, 176 N.E. 791 (1931), where the court held that a member must await the
convention more than a year hence and in a city outside his state before he can appeal to the
court.
31. See Local 4, Nat'l Organization Masters v. Brown, 258 Ala. 18, 61 So. 2d 93 (1952).
See also Beedie v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 25 NJ. Super. 269, 96 A.2d 89 (App.
Div. 1953); Local 104, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 33
Wash. 2d 1, 203 P.2d 1019 (1949).
32. Irwin v. Lorio, 169 La. 1090, 126 So. 669 (1930).
33. Schou v. Sotoyome Tribe, 140 Cal. 254, 73 Pac. 996 (1903); Myers v. Jenkins, 63 Ohio
St. 101, 119-22, 57 N.E. 1089, 1093-94 (1900) (dictum); Wilson v. Miller, 194 Tenn. 390,
250 S.W.2d 575 (1952).
34. Thorman v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 49 Cal. 2d 629, 635,
320 P.2d 494, 498 (1958); accord, Born v. Cease, 101 F. Supp. 473 (D. Alaska 1951);
Wilson v. Miller, 194 Tenn. 390, 250 S.W.2d 575 (1952).
35. Voluntary Relief Dep't v. Spencer, 17 Ind. App. 123, 46 N.E. 477 (1897); Supreme
Lodge of Order of Select Friends v. Dey, 58 Kan. 283, 49 Pac. 74 (1897).
36. Seligman v. Toledo Moving Picture Operators Union, 88 Ohio App. 137, 98 N.E.2d
54 (1947); Brown v. Harris County Medical Soc'y, 194 S.W. 1179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
37. Compare Corregan v. Hay, 94 App. Div. 71, 87 N.Y. Supp. 956 (1904), and Reilly v.
Hogan, 32 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd men., 264 App. Div. 855, 36 N.Y.S.2d 423
(1942), with Fish v. Huddell, 51 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cit. 1931), and Hall v. Morrin, 293 S.W.
435 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927).
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TYPES OF INJURY AS THE BASIS OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Judicial protection of membership in private associations from un-
justified expulsion quite frequently occurs. For reinstatement to be de-
creed the plaintiff must allege an injury of one of three types. Relief
may be afforded on the basis that membership in the association creates
a contract between the member and the association, gives the member
an interest in the group property, or creates a valuable personal relation-
ship. On the basis of protecting any one of these interests an expelled
member may be given redress. In reviewing an expulsion a court will
avoid a de novo review, treating the association tribunal as an administra-
tive tribunal. The inquiry will be limited to ascertaining whether the
action was taken in bad faith or was contrary to the law of the land."8
Implied Contract Theory
The most elementary means of protecting a member from an un-
justifiable expulsion is through the contract theory. It is thought that
membership creates a contract between the member and the association,
the terms of which are the constitution and by-laws of the association."
Thus, when a person joins a group, both he and the group are mutually
bound by the rules of the organization. An improper expulsion is treated
as a breach of contract and a ground for reinstatement."0
The inadequacies of this theory are manifold. A reviewing court is
limited to the sole determination of "whether the association has acted
within its powers in good faith, [and] in accord with its laws ... 
Thus, this theory is less than adequate for curbing the association's
powers, for it merely lays out the groundwork for determining whether
the disciplinary action was permissible according to the organization's
rules. Moreover, its inadequacy is attested to by the many exceptions to
the exhaustion of internal remedies rule where a court will purposely
disregard the contract terms to render justice in a particular instance.4 2
Legal scholars have berated this theory for its many conceptual and
logical inconsistencies.48
38. Stevenson v. Holstein-Friesian Ass'n of America, 30 F.2d 625, 627 (2d Cir. 1929);
Chafee, supra note 7, at 1005-06.
39. Slaughter v. New St. John Missionary Baptist Church, 8 La. App. 430 (1928); Brown
v. Harris County Medical Soc'y, 194 S.W. 1179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
40. Yockel v. German Am. Bund, Inc., 20 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 1940). See Farrall
v. District of Columbia AAU, 153 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
41. Smith v. Kern County Medical Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 263, 265, 120 P.2d 874, 875 (1942).
42. See notes 19-28 supra.
43. "And the contractual theory of voluntary associations can result in fictions compared to
which the supposed fiction of corporate personality has less than the ingenuity of childish in-
vention." Laski, The Personality of Associa4ons, 29 HARV. L. REv. 404, 420 (1916);
Chafee, supra note 7 at 1022.
1963]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Property Interest Theory
A second basis for adjudicating an expulsion is through the property
theory. Under this theory a member is deemed to have a property in-
terest in the assets of the organization, thus enabling a court to intervene
under the pretext of protecting the member's rights in this property.
Many courts deem this interest indispensable whenever reinstatement is
sought because of the rule that equity will only protect property rights.4
Such a rule was carried into the law of private associations in the case of
Rigby v. Connol.4" In that case the lack of any property interest in the
society was fatal to the plaintiff's case.
The nonexistence of any property interest in the congregation has
been the prevailing reason for the courts refusing to review church mem-
bership expulsions.46 Currently, however, there is emerging a line of
authority which holds that property interests exist in church membership
that are to be accorded equitable protection." Such a result is desirable,
though probing for a property interest appears to be unnecessary. Mem-
bership itself should be enough to award reinstatement.
In most instances, mere naked membership is not regarded as a prop-
erty interest. Hence, the mere allegation of membership will not usually
be enough for equitable protection. However, where the association
wields considerable economic power and membership affords one the op-
portunity of earning a living, the courts are liberal in finding member-
ship itself to be a property right.4"
The rigidity with which some courts adhere to the property interest
requirement has led other courts to require, in addition, that the plain-
tiff have a severable property interest in an association before any relief
can be granted.49 To circumvent this dubious requirement many courts
will seize upon any nominal property interest. This results in nothing
more than paying lip service to this requirement. Thus, it has been held
44. See Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARv.
L. REV. 640, 642-50 (1916).
45. L.R. [1880) 14 Ch.D. 482; accord, Howard v. Betts, 190 Ga. 530, 9 S.E.2d 742 (1940);
Irwin v. Lorio, 169 La. 1090, 126 So. 669 (1930); Hopson v. Swansy, 1 S.W.2d 419 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1927).
46. Hundley v. Collins, 131 Ala. 234, 32 So. 575 (1902); State ex rel. Hatfield v. Cummins,
171 Ind. 112, 85 N.E. 359 (1908); Cooper v. Bell, 269 Ky. 63, 106 S.W.2d 124 (1937);
Jenkins v. New Shiloh Baptist Church, 189 Md. 512, 56 A.2d 788 (1948); Dees v. Moss
Point Baptist Church, 64 Miss. 1, 17 So. 1 (1892); Nance v Busby, 91 Tenn. 303, 18 S.W.
874 (1895); Minton v. Leavell, 297 S.W. 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
47. E.g., Randolph v. First Baptist Church, 120 N.E.2d 485 (Ohio C.P. 1954) (property
interest in church's assets in case of dissolution). See Comment, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 322,
326-30 (1955); Note, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 464 (1928).
48. Hickman v. Kline, 71 Nev. 55, 279 P.2d 662 (1955); Joseph v. Passaic Hosp. Ass'n,
26 N.J. 557, 141 A.2d 18 (1958). See Metropolitan Base Ball Club v. Simmons, 17 Phila.
419, 1 Pa. County Ct. 134 (C.P. 1885).
49. E.g., State ex rel. Baunhoff v. Taxpayers' League, 87 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. Cr. App. 1935).
[VOL 14:2
Private Associations
that a fund to pay funeral expenses of members," the association's mu-
seums and libraries," and the franchise of the organization w are property
interests in which a member has a right.
The property interest theory, though replete with many disadvantages,
is far superior to the contract theory in offering protection to a member
from an unjustified expulsion. Under the property rationale, once the
requisite interest is found, the court can adjudicate the expulsion from a
procedural and substantive viewpoint;" whereas under the contract
theory, the court merely determines whether an association has followed
its own rules, not whether the expulsion violates any civil rights of the
member or is contrary to public policy. Despite such superiority, the
property interest concept does not fully protect the aggrieved member.
Courts, in many instances, are prevented from hearing meritorious cases
due to the lack of the requisite property interest. The necessity of find-
ing a property interest should be wholly irrelevant to the inquiry. The
object of the suit is the protection of the status of the member. The
presence or absence of a property interest should not determine the pro-
priety of intervention in a particular instance.54 Furthermore, by basing
a decision on this factor the real interest of the member, that of a valu-
able personal relationship, is overlooked.
Valuable Personal Relationship Theory
The third means of protecting a member from an unwarranted ex-
pulsion is by deeming membership itself to create such a valuable per-
sonal relationship that a court of equity will protect it.5" Only a substan-
tial injury to this interest will warrant such specific relief. Under this
theory the true interest of the member is recognized, and this personal
relationship is deemed paramount. "
The substantiality of this interest in an association is evidenced from
the consequences of expulsion or suspension.
50. State ex rel. Hyde v. Jackson County Medical Soc'y, 295 Mo. 144, 243 S.W. 341 (1922).
51. Gregg v. Massachusetts Medical Socy, 111 Mass. 185 (1872). See Spayd v. Ringing
Rock Lodge No. 665, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Ad. 70 (1921); see also Holcombe v. Leavitt, 124
N.Y. Supp. 980 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
52. State ex rel. Waring v. Georgia Medical Soc'y, 38 Ga. 608 (1869).
53. Franklin v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World, 145 Okla. 159, 291 Pac. 513
(1930). See also Davis v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 60 Cal. App.
2d 713, 141 P.2d 486 (1943); Yockel v. German Am. Bund, Inc., 20 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
54. See generally WALSH, EQuITy § 52 (1930).
55. Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa
Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 293 P.2d 862 (1956). Cf. Brown v. Harris County
Medical Soc'y, 194 S.W. 1179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
56. Compare Sims v. University Interscholastic League, 111 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937), dismissed as moot, 133 Tex. 605, 131 S.W.2d 94 (1939), with Sult v. Gilbert, 148
Fla. 31, 3 So. 2d 729 (1941).
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The expulsion of one from a dub, social organization or the like im-
plies that he cannot get along with his fellows, or even worse that
he is unfit to be associated with. Once the news of his expulsion is
bruited about the consequences in his personal and in his business life
can be very harmful57
The possible graveness of being expelled from a private society is
exemplified in an expulsion from a medical association. The ex-
pelled member may find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain medical
malpractice insurance." He is likely to lose his hospital privileges and
staff rights,59 with the consequential effect of not being able to be certi-
fied as a specialist. Furthermore, he may be unable to consult with other
doctors because they might fear censure by the medical society.' In a
similar vein, "excommunication from a church means loss of the oppor-
tunity to worship God in familiar surroundings with a cherished ritual,
and inflicts upon the devout believer loneliness of spirit and perhaps the
dread of eternal damnation."'
From these examples it is evident that expulsion often may result
in serious harm to the individual. If the expulsion is wrongful, this fac-
tor alone should warrant reinstatement. The greater the economic con-
trol of the group, the more serious are the consequences of expulsion,
thus, making it easier for a court to find the substantial personal relation-
ship interest necessary for protection.
Protection of a valuable personal relationship appears to be the best
basis for relief. The other two theories are deficient in significant re-
spects. The property interest theory is most often respected in form but
blatantly disregarded in practice. Though courts purport to protect a
property or contract right, they are, in reality, only soothing hurt feelings
in many instances. The personal relationship theory goes to the heart
of the matter. It affords the aggrieved person redress if the economic
or emotional deprivations resulting from expulsion are substantial. The
totality of the injury is considered. No attempt is made to pigeon-hole
the injury. The substantiality of the injury is the criterion, thus, afford-
ing flexibility and producing more equitable results.
SUBSTANTIVE BASES FOR REINSTATEMENT
A body of somewhat settled law has developed from the great num-
ber of cases involving expulsion from private associations. A division
57. de Funiak, Equitable Protection of Personal or Individual Rights, 36 KY. LJ. 7, 26
(1947). See Chafee, supra note 7, at 998: "The expelled club member finds his social repu-
tation blasted, and is likely to be blackballed by other desirable dubs."
58. Note, 63 YALE L.J. 938, 951 (1954).
59. See Group Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 617-25, 237
P.2d 737, 755-58 (1951).
60. Id. at 632, 663-64, 237 P.2d at 767, 778.
61. Chafee, supra note 7, at 998.
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into two rather distinct areas has developed from the case law. First, an
expulsion will be nullified if it has violated the concept of "natural law."
The "natural law" concept can be equated with due process. Secondly, a
reinstatement will be ordered if it is shown that an association has neg-
lected to follow its own procedure, as found in its constitution and by-
laws, in expelling a member. A corollary of this proposition is that the
courts will not countenance an expulsion which is authorized by a con-
stitutional provision, by-law, or regulation that is contrary to law or pub-
lic policy.
Natural Law Requirements
The requirement that an expulsion be in accord with natural law
means that the courts have developed a due process standard for private
associations. A universal requisite is that the member who is about to
be expelled receive a fair hearing or trial.62 Notice of the hearing must
also be given to the member," and it must be sent early enough to give
the member an opportunity to prepare a defense.64 The notice must set
forth the charges against the member and that the hearing is being held
for the purpose of considering the expulsion of the member." A court
will carefully examine a summary expulsion without these procedural
safeguards. Another factor of prime importance is that the tribunal
must be impartial. The same person sitting as judge, jury, and execu-
tioner will not be tolerated. In one case, an expelled member was rein-
stated because a brother of the one who pressed the charges sat on the
trial committee. Such a situation deprived the plaintiff of a fair trial.6
At the trial the member must have the right to cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses. 7 It does not appear, however, that there is a right to
be represented by legal counsel. The most that will be required is that
the prosecution and defense be placed on the same footing. Thus, if the
prosecutor is a layman, the member on trial is only entitled to another
62. Reid v. Medical Soy, 156 N.Y. Supp. 780 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff'd mem., 177 App. Div.
939, 163 N.Y. Supp. 1129 (1917); Blenko v. Schmeltz, 362 Pa. 365, 67 A.2d 99 (1949).
63. Slater v. Supreme Lodge, 76 Mo. App. 387 (1898); Langnecker v. Trustees of Grand
Lodge, 111 Wis. 279, 87 N.W. 293 (1901).
64. Gallaher v. American Legion, 154 Misc. 281, 277 N.Y. Supp. 81 (Sup. Ct.), afd mrem.,
242 App. Div. 604, 271 N.Y. Supp. 1109 (1934).
65. People ex rel. Meads v. Alpha Lodge No. 1 of Knights of Sobriety, Fidelity & Integrity,
13 Misc. 677, 35 N.Y. Supp. 214 (Sup. Ct. 1895), afl'd mem., 40 N.Y. Supp. 1147 (App.
Div. 1896).
66. Ibid. See State ex rel. Mayfield v. St. Louis Medical Soc'y, 91 Mo. App. 76 (1901);
Way v. Patton, 195 Ore. 36, 241 P.2d 895 (1952); Blenko v. Schmeltz, 362 Pa. 365, 67 A.2d
99 (1949).
67. Brooks v. ]Emgar, 259 App. Div. 333, 19 N.Y.S.2d 114, appeal dismissed maem., 284
N.Y. 767, 31 N.E.2d 514 (1940); Fales v. Missions' Protective Union, 40 R.I. 34, 99 Ad.
823 (1917).
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layman as defense counsel unless, of course, the association otherwise
agrees.
8
On the other hand, application of the due process requirement will
not prevent a member from being expelled at a second trial even though
he was acquitted at an earlier trial on the same charges.69 Provision for
such an eventuality must appear in the constitution or by-laws. Similarly,
a prior acquittal of a criminal charge in a court of law will not prevent
an expulsion by the association based on the same charges.7"
It is evident from this brief summary that there is a parallel to the
requirements of constitutional due process. Fairness is the overriding
factor. The deviant member must be advised of the charges against him.
Only then can a reasonably impartial tribunal find him guilty and im-
pose a penalty.
Public Policy Requirements
Generally, an association has no right to expel or discipline a mem-
ber for exercising a right or performing a duty as a citizen. Any pro-
vision authorizing censure for such activities will not be permitted to
stand because it is repugnant to public policy. Thus, an expulsion from a
medical society was nullified where a member was expelled for being
a surety on a Negro's bond,71 or for being a witness against another
doctor in a judicial proceeding,7" or for favoring free suffrage in contra-
vention to the policy of the group.7"
Contract of Membership Requirements
As noted above, many courts have attributed a contractual charac-
teristic to membership in private associations. Pursuant to this, courts
have held that an association is bound to follow its own rules in expel-
ling a member so long as these rules are not invalid for some other
reason. Failure to follow the procedure set out in the association's
constitution and by-laws will render the expulsion void.74 Finally, good
faith is required of a group in the expulsion of an undesirable member."
68. See Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARv. L. Rsv. 609, 616
(1959).
69. Rueb v. Rehder, 24 N.M. 534, 174 Pac. 992 (1918); Thompson v. Grand Int'l Bhd.
of Locomotive Engineers, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 176, 91 S.W. 834 (19051).
70. Miller v. Hennepin County Medical Soc'y, 124 Minn. 314, 144 N.W. 1091 (1914).
71. State ex rel. Waring v. Georgia Medical Soc'y, 38 Ga. 608 (1869).
72. Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 293 P.2d 862
(Dist. Ct. App. 1956). See People ex rel. Gray v. Medical Soc'y, 24 Barb. 570 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1857).
73. Stein v. Marks, 44 Misc. 140, 89 N.Y. Supp. 921 (Sup. Ct. 1904). See Manning v.
Klein, 1 Pa. Super. 210 (1895).
74. Harris v. National Union of Marine Cooks, 98 Cal. App. 2d 733, 221 P.2d 136 (1950);
Joseph v. Passaic Hosp. Ass'n, 26 N.J. 557, 141 A.2d 18 (1958).
75. E.g., Fleming v. Moving Picture Mach. Operators, 16 N.J. Misc. 502, 1 A.2d 849 (Ch.
1938), afrd per curiam, 124 N.J. Eq. 269, 1 A.2d 386 (Ct. Err. & App. 1938).
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Judicial control over unjustified expulsions has developed in two
ways. First, the aggrieved member must be afforded basic procedural
due process before he can be expelled. Secondly, even though the ex-
pulsion is authorized by the laws of the organization, an expulsion will
not be permitted to stand if these laws are contrary to public policy.
JUDICIALLY COMPELLED ADMISSION
A difficult area of the law is opened when a person applies for mem-
bership in a private association and is summarily refused. Barring a
change of position by the association, the frustrated person then must
seek a court order compelling his admission. In such a situation neither
the property theory nor the contract theory is applicable. The contract
fiction cannot be stretched to one not a party to the compact. Neither
is the property theory of any help, for the non-member cannot possibly
be deemed to have an interest in an association's property."
Traditionally, there has been a unanimity of opinion that a non-
member is without a right to be admitted to membership in an associa-
tion which has not selected him according to its rules," there being no
"abstract right to be admitted" to membership in a voluntary associa-
tion."8 The arbitrariness or unreasonableness of the exclusion will not
spell a different resuit nor will it give"rise to a cause of action for
damages." Though one may claim to be a member because he has re-
ceived some indicia of membership, a court will usually accept the asso-
ciation's determination that the. person. is not a member."0
Judicially compelled admission is not an entirely new phenomenon,
In the area of labor law courts have-regularly compelled unions to admit
persons who were reasonably qualified where .the .union has attained a
closed shop."' Such was not always the case because, at the common
76. Cf. Carroll v. Local 269, Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 133 NJ. Eq. 144, 31 A.2d 223
(Ch. 1943).
77. E.g., Sebastian v. Quarter Century Club of United Shoe Mach. Corp., 327 Mass. 178, 97
N.E.2d 413 (1951); Barazani v. Brighton & Manhattan Beach Chamber of Commrce, 20
Misc. 2d 844, 194 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Cr. 1959); Gold Knob Outdoor Advertising Co. v.'
Outdoor Advertising Ass'n, 225 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Ross v. Ebert, 275
Wis. 523, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957).
78. Mayer v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Ass'n, 47 NJ. Eq. 519, 524, 20 Ad. 492, 494 (Ch.
1890).
79. Arnstein v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 29 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.
N.Y. 1939); Trautwein v. Harbourt, 40 N.J. Super. 247, 123 A.2d 30 (App. Div.), certifica-
tion denied, 22 NJ. 220, 125 A.2d 233 (1956).
80. Barazani v. Brighton & Manhattan Beach Chamber of Commerce, 20 Misc. 2d 844, 194
N.Y.S. 2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1959); State ex rel. Hartigan v. Monongalia County Medical Soc'y,
97 W.Va. 273, 124 S.E. 826 (1924). See Pirics v. First Russian Slavonic Greek Benevolent
Soc'y, 83 N.J. Eq. 29, 89 Ad. 1036 (Ch. 1914).
A court will enjoin persons from assuming the privileges of membership if they were not
regularly elected. See Medical Soc'y v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 16 So. 2d 321 (1944).
81. See, e.g., James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); Wilson v.
Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 NJ. Eq. 347, 197 Ad. 720 (Ch. 1938).
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law, admission to a labor union was not protected. Unions were regarded
as private clubs, membership being a privilege but not a right. Hence,
"it would be quite impractical for the courts to undertake to compel men
to receive into their social relationships one who was personally dis-
agreeable whether for a good reason or for a bad reason." 2  Today,
with the tremendous power which unions have over the supply of labor,
the courts have imposed more and greater restrictions on the freedom
of choice of members. The social amenities have all but been absorbed
by the economic ramifications of union membership.
The most extensive judicial control of membership exists where the
union has attained the closed shop status, thus exerting a virtual mo-
nopoly over the supply of labor. It seems repugnant to one's sense of
justice to allow a union to negotiate a contract where all work is to be
done by its members and at the same time to allow the union to re-
strict its membership. The union so situated "must either surrender
its monopoly or else admit to membership all qualified persons who de-
sire to carry on the trade ... ."" This must be the rule because a union
which has attained a closed shop "occupies a quasi public position similar
to that of a public service" 4 which has to serve all comers. A union in
this position loses its freedom from judicial restraint, a freedom en-
joyed by social and fraternal organizations, to choose its members in
an uncontrolled manner. Because of the basic importance of earning a
living the union is given a choice - admit the person to membership
or, in the alternative, refrain from enforcing the agreement against him. "
A California court has gone as far as compelling that the plaintiff be ad-
mitted to union membership without any alternative."e No reason was
given by the court for this holding.
Most of the friction results from the discriminatory practices of un-
ions. For example, one court granted relief against a union which dis-
criminated in admission solely because of race, creed, or color, T while
82. Frank v. National Alliance of Bill Posters, 89 N.J.L. 380, 381, 99 Ad. 134, 135 (Sup.
Ct. 1916).
83. Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N.J. Eq. 347, 351, 197 Ad. 720,
722 (Ch. 1938). See Clark v. Curtis, 273 App. Div. 797, 76 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1947), afi'd,
297 N.Y. 1014, 80 N.E.2d 536 (1948).
84. James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 731, 155 P.2d 329, 335 (1944).
85. Williams v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. 2d 586, 165 P.2d 903 (1946);
Riviello v. Journeymen Barbers Union, 88 Cal. App. 2d 499, 199 P.2d 400 (1948); Seligman
v. Toledo Moving Picture Operators Union, 88 Ohio App. 137, 98 N.E.2d 54 (1947). See
Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COLuM. L. REV. 33, 44-51 (1947).
86. Thorman v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320
P.2d 494 (1958).
87. Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946). Contra, Oliphant v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen, 156 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ohio), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 893 (1957);
Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957). See generally Rauh, Civil Rights and
Liberties and Labor Unions, 8 LAB. I.J. 874 (1957).
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another court refused to enforce a contract provision which discriminated
against women bartenders."8 In the area of union discrimination, legis-
lation in several states has sought to correct similar inequities."9
Aside from the labor union cases, courts have been zealous in pro-
tecting the rights of persons who are refused admission to professional
associations which, in terms of economic reality, are not really "volun-
tary," but in fact are involuntary because they are necessary for economic
survival." A recent New Jersey decision graphically illustrates this
point. In Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Socy? the plaintiff
sought full membership to the county medical society. His application
was denied because three of his four years of medical training were spent
in a non-approved osteopathic college. As a result of this refusal to ad-
mit, the plaintiff was denied access to local hospitals because they would
lose their accreditation if they extended their facilities to one ineligible
for membership in the county medical society. The Supreme Court of
New Jersey affirmed a lower court ruling compelling admission and full
membership. The rationale of the court's action was
that where an organization is in fact involuntary and/or is of such a
nature that the court should intervene to protect the public, and where
an exclusion results in substantial injury to a plaintiff, the court will
grant relief....02
The involuntary characteristic is the crucial one. It is the control which
an association exerts over the practice or trade that determines whether
it is voluntary. In the practice of medicine, deprivation of hospital facili-
ties seriously handicaps the physician's ability to successfully practice
medicine.93 There is a dose analogy in this instance between the medical
society and the public service company, and because of this, it is incum-
bent that the uncontrolled power of admission be limited.
If one is reasonably qualified for membership in such a group there
appears to be no valid reason to exclude him. 4 A substantial injury re-
sults from the loss of opportunity to earn a living by limiting the eco-
88. Wilson v. Hacker, 200 Misc. 124, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
89. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-5-1(4) (1953); N.Y. ExEctrvE LAw
296(1) (b).
90. See Group Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737
(1951). See also Rex v. Askew, 4 Burr. 2186, 98 Eng. Rep. 139 (K.B. 1788). Cf. Hub-
bard v. Medical Serv. Corp., 367 P.2d 1003 (Wash. 1962).
91. 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324 (L 1960), aff'd, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
See Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital, 76 N.J. Super. 149, 183 A.2d 878 (L. 1962).
92. 62 N.J. Super. 184, 197, 162 A.2d 324, 331.
93. Use of hospital facilities is probably more of a privilege than a right. See Haymon v.
City of Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927). But see Note, 31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 286 (1956);
Note, 63 YALr LJ. 937, 952-53 (1954).
94. In most states an osteopath is given a license equal to that of an M.D. See Note, 31
NOTRE DAME LAW. 286, 294-95 (1956). Cf. Harris v. Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068, 1077(Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
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nomic avenues available to the non-member. In view of this, compelled
admission to such associations is justified.
CONCLUSION
Though there has been a great multitude of cases involving private
associations, the law is far from settled. In most instances, judicial aloof-
ness is desirable because of the public interest in fostering self-governing
associations. Yet, with recognition of the many economic advantages
in belonging to such organizations, there has evolved a body of law
which protects against an unjustifiable or arbitrary exclusion. The de-
sirability of developing a hard and fast rule, though affording simplicity
of application, does not appear more beneficial than allowing various
groups the freedom of selecting who they want to be members. Such
selectivity has commendably raised the standards of many professions
such as law and medicine.
In compelling the admission of an individual to an association courts
should be more careful and set higher standards. Where an "organiza-
tion has a business monopoly" 5 or is one in which membership is an
"economic necessity' '"" it is justifiable to compel admission. Ordinarily,
however, social and fraternal societies have no such leverage, so their
absolute discretion in admission should remain unimpaired. If the or-
ganization is, in fact, involuntary, it should not be allowed arbitrarily to
exclude persons who are reasonably qualified.
Courts should be cognizant of alternative remedies. In Hubbard v.
Medical Serv. Corp.97 the court enjoined a private medical bureau from
refusing to refer its patients to doctors who were not members of the
medical group. This was declared to be an illegal boycott. 8  Such re-
lief may be more desirable than forcing oneself upon a group when,
through such means, a non-member can still reap the benefits of belong-
ing to the association. In any case, the relief granted must be tailored
to meet the threat to economic opportunity.
PAUL A. MANCINO
95. Sebastian v. Quarter Century Club of United Shoe Mach. Corp., 327 Mass. 178, 181,
97 N.E.2d 412, 413 (1951).
96. Trautwein v. Harbourt, 40 N.J. Super. 247, 264, 123 A.2d 30, 39 (App. Div.), certi-
fication denied, 22 N.J. 220, 125 A.2d 233 (1956).
97. 367 P.2d 1003 (Wash. 1962). Cf. Wilson v. Hacker, 200 Misc. 124, 101 N.Y.S.2d
461 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
98. The real basis of the decision appears to be that allowing such a practice would be in-
imical to the best interests of the patient, for it is the doctor's duty to secure the best possible
treatment for his patient.
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